The Lack of Reason for God, Intermission
Nov. 5th, 2014 02:44 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
blimixThis is part of a series examining the the logic of Timothy Keller's book The Reason for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism.
Standard disclaimer: This, despite being a public post, is not an invitation for a religion debate with strangers. Been there, done that, still jaded.
Last week: In Chapter 7, we explored taking the Bible literally.
Intermission
In which Keller, thinking that he has spent the first half of the book knocking down the objections to theism and Christianity, claims that he will spend the rest of the book building a case for Christianity.
(Page numbers are from the hardcover version of the book.)
p. 118. "Dawkins, for example, says that the claim of God's existence is a scientific hypothesis that should be open to rational demonstration." Keller claims that this constitutes "strong rationalism," a particular epistemology which "the great majority" of philosophers think "is nearly impossible to defend". He seems to think that attacking "strong rationalism" will quiet all rational concerns that god, as an untestable hypothesis, is not a valid explanation.
Any sort of rationalist should be skeptical of a claim that is not open to rational demonstration. Attacking only "strong rationalism" in particular doesn't make god immune to rational inquiry.
p. 118."[Strong rationalism] can't live up to its own standards. How could you empirically prove that no one should believe something without empirical proof? You can't, and that reveals it to be, ultimately, a belief."
A statement about what one "should" do is a recommendation, not a statement of objective fact. If I recommend that you not drive drunk, you may or may not argue, but "You can't prove it" isn't a valid response. If, on the other hand, Keller is challenging the belief (underlying this recommendation) that it is better to base one's beliefs on demonstrable reality than not to, then one might wonder whether Keller believes he has any reason, upon leaving home, to prefer his front door to an upstairs window.
p. 119. Keller quotes Thomas Nagel: "I don't want there to be a God: I don't want the universe to be like that... I am curious whether there is anyone who is genuinely indifferent as to whether there is a God -- anyone who, whatever his actual belief about the matter, doesn't particularly want either one of the answers to be correct." Keller presents an example of a judge with a conflict of interest, and says, "Nagel is saying that when it comes to God, we are all like the judge."
No. Nagel is saying that he, himself, is like the judge. He then explicitly wonders whether everyone else is. (In fact, I can address Nagel's question. While I would not like there to be an evil god, and I would be pleased if a benevolent god were to spring into existence, I have no desire one way or the other regarding the existence of a god in general. Also, even biased researchers can overcome the obstacle that their bias presents by using double-blind studies.)
p. 120. Keller quotes a review in which Terry Eagleton disagrees with and mocks Richard Dawkins's The God Delusion. No reasons are given.
p. 120. "If we reject strong rationalism, are we then stuck in relativism -- without any way to judge one set of beliefs from another? Not at all. In Chapters 2 and 3 I argued that complete relativism is impossible to maintain."
He did no such thing. Chapter 3 was dedicated to defending Christianity's restrictions on intellectual freedom as palatable, rather than correct. In Chapter 2 (pp. 23-25), Keller invoked the "You can't see things from god's perspective" idea, stating that we don't really know what's good, in order to dismiss concerns about god doing evil. In Chapter 5 (pp. 72-73), he argues that our understanding of progress is completely relative, and thus we have no basis for challenging the Bible's regressive positions. In Chapter 1, he argued that you cannot claim that Christianity doesn't have the whole truth, if you yourself don't have the whole truth. Whenever it is convenient, he is happy to invoke factual relativism, saying, "Well, how can we know what's really true, anyway?"
p. 120. Keller claims that he will proceed from here using critical rationalism. "It assumes that some systems of belief are more reasonable than others, but that all arguments are rationally avoidable in the end. That is, you can always find reason to escape it that is not sheer bias or stubbornness."
Critical rationalism holds that theories can never be supported by arguments or evidence, but it is clear about the idea that theories can be conclusively disproven. This latter point seems to have escaped Keller.
p. 121. Keller tries to use science as an example. "A theory is considered empirically verified if it organizes the evidence and explains phenomena better than any conceivable alternative theory. That is, if, through testing, it leads us to expect with accuracy many and varied events better than any other rival account of the same data, then it is accepted, though not (in the strong rationalist sense) 'proved.'"
Now Keller has missed the former point about critical rationalism, which claims that evidence does not support theories. Also, critical rationalism advocates accepting the least likely theory (among those that have not been disproved). This is the opposite of what Keller has just described.
It appears that Keller is trying to hide his factual relativism and bad reasoning behind the word "rationalism," to gain the appearance of credibility. But he fails in two ways: First, by failing to actually employ critical rationalism; and second, by choosing a theory of knowledge that not only does not claim to find or support truth, but which claims that truth cannot be found or supported. No matter what evidence or arguments one presents, critical rationalism will never support a positive statement such as "God exists" or "Christianity is correct".
What Keller describes, a form of reasoning that aims to come up with a theory that is likely even if it cannot be proven, is called "abductive reasoning". This (rather than deductive reasoning) is what Sherlock Holmes was famous for, and what scientists employ when considering likely hypotheses.
pp. 121-123. Keller asserts that Christianity and god are the best available explanations for the world as we see it. He hints that the rest of the book will be dedicated to demonstrating this.
The fact that Christian ideas (such as a benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent god) are incompatible with observations of the real world (as established in Chapters 2 and 6) renders pointless the consideration of arguments in favor of them. In the spirit of completeness, I will set aside this objection and prepare to wade through the second half of the book.
Next week: Evidence for the existence of god?
The whole series.
Standard disclaimer: This, despite being a public post, is not an invitation for a religion debate with strangers. Been there, done that, still jaded.
Last week: In Chapter 7, we explored taking the Bible literally.
In which Keller, thinking that he has spent the first half of the book knocking down the objections to theism and Christianity, claims that he will spend the rest of the book building a case for Christianity.
(Page numbers are from the hardcover version of the book.)
p. 118. "Dawkins, for example, says that the claim of God's existence is a scientific hypothesis that should be open to rational demonstration." Keller claims that this constitutes "strong rationalism," a particular epistemology which "the great majority" of philosophers think "is nearly impossible to defend". He seems to think that attacking "strong rationalism" will quiet all rational concerns that god, as an untestable hypothesis, is not a valid explanation.
Any sort of rationalist should be skeptical of a claim that is not open to rational demonstration. Attacking only "strong rationalism" in particular doesn't make god immune to rational inquiry.
p. 118."[Strong rationalism] can't live up to its own standards. How could you empirically prove that no one should believe something without empirical proof? You can't, and that reveals it to be, ultimately, a belief."
A statement about what one "should" do is a recommendation, not a statement of objective fact. If I recommend that you not drive drunk, you may or may not argue, but "You can't prove it" isn't a valid response. If, on the other hand, Keller is challenging the belief (underlying this recommendation) that it is better to base one's beliefs on demonstrable reality than not to, then one might wonder whether Keller believes he has any reason, upon leaving home, to prefer his front door to an upstairs window.
p. 119. Keller quotes Thomas Nagel: "I don't want there to be a God: I don't want the universe to be like that... I am curious whether there is anyone who is genuinely indifferent as to whether there is a God -- anyone who, whatever his actual belief about the matter, doesn't particularly want either one of the answers to be correct." Keller presents an example of a judge with a conflict of interest, and says, "Nagel is saying that when it comes to God, we are all like the judge."
No. Nagel is saying that he, himself, is like the judge. He then explicitly wonders whether everyone else is. (In fact, I can address Nagel's question. While I would not like there to be an evil god, and I would be pleased if a benevolent god were to spring into existence, I have no desire one way or the other regarding the existence of a god in general. Also, even biased researchers can overcome the obstacle that their bias presents by using double-blind studies.)
p. 120. Keller quotes a review in which Terry Eagleton disagrees with and mocks Richard Dawkins's The God Delusion. No reasons are given.
p. 120. "If we reject strong rationalism, are we then stuck in relativism -- without any way to judge one set of beliefs from another? Not at all. In Chapters 2 and 3 I argued that complete relativism is impossible to maintain."
He did no such thing. Chapter 3 was dedicated to defending Christianity's restrictions on intellectual freedom as palatable, rather than correct. In Chapter 2 (pp. 23-25), Keller invoked the "You can't see things from god's perspective" idea, stating that we don't really know what's good, in order to dismiss concerns about god doing evil. In Chapter 5 (pp. 72-73), he argues that our understanding of progress is completely relative, and thus we have no basis for challenging the Bible's regressive positions. In Chapter 1, he argued that you cannot claim that Christianity doesn't have the whole truth, if you yourself don't have the whole truth. Whenever it is convenient, he is happy to invoke factual relativism, saying, "Well, how can we know what's really true, anyway?"
p. 120. Keller claims that he will proceed from here using critical rationalism. "It assumes that some systems of belief are more reasonable than others, but that all arguments are rationally avoidable in the end. That is, you can always find reason to escape it that is not sheer bias or stubbornness."
Critical rationalism holds that theories can never be supported by arguments or evidence, but it is clear about the idea that theories can be conclusively disproven. This latter point seems to have escaped Keller.
p. 121. Keller tries to use science as an example. "A theory is considered empirically verified if it organizes the evidence and explains phenomena better than any conceivable alternative theory. That is, if, through testing, it leads us to expect with accuracy many and varied events better than any other rival account of the same data, then it is accepted, though not (in the strong rationalist sense) 'proved.'"
Now Keller has missed the former point about critical rationalism, which claims that evidence does not support theories. Also, critical rationalism advocates accepting the least likely theory (among those that have not been disproved). This is the opposite of what Keller has just described.
It appears that Keller is trying to hide his factual relativism and bad reasoning behind the word "rationalism," to gain the appearance of credibility. But he fails in two ways: First, by failing to actually employ critical rationalism; and second, by choosing a theory of knowledge that not only does not claim to find or support truth, but which claims that truth cannot be found or supported. No matter what evidence or arguments one presents, critical rationalism will never support a positive statement such as "God exists" or "Christianity is correct".
What Keller describes, a form of reasoning that aims to come up with a theory that is likely even if it cannot be proven, is called "abductive reasoning". This (rather than deductive reasoning) is what Sherlock Holmes was famous for, and what scientists employ when considering likely hypotheses.
pp. 121-123. Keller asserts that Christianity and god are the best available explanations for the world as we see it. He hints that the rest of the book will be dedicated to demonstrating this.
The fact that Christian ideas (such as a benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent god) are incompatible with observations of the real world (as established in Chapters 2 and 6) renders pointless the consideration of arguments in favor of them. In the spirit of completeness, I will set aside this objection and prepare to wade through the second half of the book.
Next week: Evidence for the existence of god?
The whole series.
